Since the beginning of 1980s, many countries decided to reform and regulate some public utilities such as water, electricity, gas etc. Since, the public utilities specially water are managed as regional or local entities, the benchmarking approaches are therefore applied to compare the performance of local firms active in an industry on the basis of their relative efficiency along with ways that are used to determine the yardstick model for evaluating the performance of such enterprises. Thus, this study aims at measuring the efficiency of water & wastewater companies (WWCs) as incentive regulation tools for stimulating efficiency of production and supply through cost reduction and improving the quality of services provide by water distributors. In this study, the performances of 34 WWCs were assessed using non-parametric methods as "Data Envelopment Analysis" (DEA) in 2011. Furthermore, we reviewed the DEA-based Malmquist approach for total factor productivity (TFP) and technology change in WWCs over the period of 2008 to 2011. An input variable includes operating costs, number of employees (staff) and number of water connections and output variables are the volumes of water billed and the number of customers. The results of analysis indicate that the average efficiency of WWCs under constant return to scale (CRS) is equal to 77% (technical efficiency) and under variable return to scale (VRS) is equal to 88% (scale efficiency). In other words, given the existing resources and facilities, the potential to improve water production equals to 23% and 12% respectively. Whereas in terms of constant return to scale (CRS), the cost saving potential amounts to 1874 billion Rials or 16% of the operating costs (price=2011). Also, the Malmquist index for total factor productivity (TFP) and technology change are calculated as 0.951 and 0.940 respectively, indicating a decrease of productivity in the Iranian water & wastewater industry during 2008 to 2011.
Introduction
In most countries, infrastructural industries or public utilities such as water, electricity, gas, telecommunications and transportation, which are mostly run as monopolies, have always been owned and managed by the public sector, However the late 1980s, the industry started the privatization trend both in terms of management (private sector participation) and in terms of ownership (privatization). In addition to this, the services in some parts of or the entire industry have come out of monopoly. However, evidence shows that privatization can't improve the cost and the quality of services provided. Consistent with the provisions of a proper regulation, it is essential to provide sufficient incentives for operators in utilities to reduce costs and to increase efficiency. The regulation systems cover service cost, price cap, yardstick competition (YC) and franchise revenues. Some systems such as price cap and yardstick competition need benchmarking techniques as tools for regulation.
The process of benchmarking has long been used by private enterprises, but has only recently been applied in the public sector, particularly in the infrastructural services. As mentioned by Shleifer (1985) , regulators need a simple benchmark, other than the firm's present or past performance, against which they can evaluate the firm's potentials and assure cost control, prevent waste, and promote cost reducing innovation. The basis of a benchmarking technique is the establishment of an efficiency frontier in which each firm occupies a relative position. Comparability of outputs and inputs across each firm is a key element, but the most crucial aspect is the selection of the measures of efficiency. The key point is that regulators must make choices reflecting overriding objectives of water users, firm managers, and policymakers. Selecting a measure of efficiency is also complicated by the fact that, although both financial and non-financial measures are used, there is a lack of an accepted framework for integrating the two.
In this article we have applied a particular benchmarking technique known as "Data Envelope Analysis" (DEA) to compare the performance of local firms operating in the water and wastewater industry of Iran. The performance and technical efficiency rankings extracted from the analysis can be used in the processes or systems of regularization including the price cap.
Need for Regulations in public utilities
According to economic theory, monopoly naturally provides a lower efficiency than the competitiveness, because firms holding monopoly have the market power to charge higher prices than the cost of the products and obtain a higher rate than normal profits. This leads to economic inefficiencies through higher prices, lower quality products, and non-optimal allocation of resources loss of welfare due to inefficiencies in the community.
Establishment of a regulation system is essential to ensure efficiency and to create incentives for monopoly firms in adjusting their pricing and production strategies to a fully competitive approach with the aim of protecting the consumers against monopoly power and maximizing the social welfare provided. Water and wastewater services in Iran were relegated to water and wastewater companies since 1990. According to legislation, these companies should be managed as private entities but the competition in this field is slow. It is necessary that this issue be investigated in Iran to actualize the potential for competition in the industry. In this context with proper regulation, regulatory reforms and deregulation of the economy, indicators of efficiency and public satisfaction should be defined to evaluate the provided services.
Regulation systems
In general, there are two types of approach to deal with the problem posed by the existence of natural monopolies. First, the regulatory agency approached. Second, the operation of a public enterprise that is selfregulated. The first approach is characterized by the presence of a regulatory agency, which has a duty to design regulatory schemes for natural monopoly operation, and the enforcement for compliance of such regulatory regime. Under the second general approach, there is a state owned company that operates as a public enterprise, which ideally, should allow the provision of services at least cost without the exertion of market power. In this second approach, because of political pressures, and financial constraints, self`-regulated public companies are expected to provide water and sanitation services at very low tariff levels, without possibilities of raising enough revenues to fund their operational costs. They therefore face serious restrictions to develop investment intended to either improve supply coverage or the quality of the provision. For this reason, and considering the aim of this report, we focused on the first approach to deal with natural monopoly problems; i.e. the existence of a regulatory agency. In this approach, there are different specific forms of regulations. Here we have considered cost-of-service (cost +), price-cap, yardstick competition, and franchise. A hybrid of these alternative systems can also be considered as alternative regulatory regimes † :
Benchmarking for regulatory purposes
One of the prime functions of quantitative benchmarking is to assist regulators to define the appropriate policy instruments for the water distribution sector, as well as for individual companies. Efficiency analysis and benchmarking was first applied to the price reviews of the UK water industry. The Water Service Regulation Authority (OFWAT) conducts these price reviews every 5 years (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009 ). The approach is used by OFWAT in the 1994 review was described by Thanassoulis (2000a, b) . OFWAT applied Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) on a company-function level in order to facilitate discrimination in the model (i.e. fewer output variables; OFWAT recognized the potential problems resulting from limiting observations, but chose not to use panel data). The efficiency results were then compared to regression results, and entered into the price determination, with the exact usage being confidential. It is important to note that price caps are not automatically determined by OFWAT (stern, 2005) , where the calculated efficiency scores are in practice not plugged one-to-one into the price cap formulas. The rationale is in general the reliability of data and performance measurement techniques as well as controlling the differences in operating characteristics and quality.
An outline of the use of DEA in the regulation of UK water companies by OFWAT through price cap is shown as , where is change to the average annual charges company j is permitted to make in year t, RPIt is the change in the Retail Prices Index from year t-1 to year t and is a company -specific factor, determined by the regulator for year t.
Efficiency measurement concepts and Benchmarking Approaches
The primary purpose of this section is to outline a number of commonly used efficiency measures and to discuss how they may be calculated relative to an efficient technology, which is generally represented by some form of frontier function. Frontiers have been estimated using many different methods over the past 40 years (represented in figure1). The two principal methods are:
• Data envelopment analysis (DEA) and • Stochastic frontiers analysis (SFA), Which involve mathematical programming and econometric methods, respectively. This paper is concerned with the use of DEA methods. The discussion in this section provides a very brief introduction to modern efficiency measurement. A more detailed provided by Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985, 1994) and Lovell (1993) . Modern efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957) who drew upon the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) to define a simple measure of firm efficiency, which could account for multiple inputs. He proposed that the efficiency of a firm consists of two components: technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices. These two measures are then combined to provide a measure of total economic efficiency. The following discussion begins with Farrell's original ideas which were illustrated in input/input space and hence had an input-reducing focus. These are usually termed input-orientated measures. Farrell illustrated his ideas using a simple example involving firms which use two inputs (x1 and x2) to produce a single output (y), under the assumption of constant returns to …… Knowledge of the unit isoquant of the fully efficient firm, represented by in Figure 2 , permits the measurement of technical efficiency. If a given firm uses quantities of inputs, defined by the point P, to produce a unit of output, the technical inefficiency of that firm could be represented by the distance QP, which is the amount by which all inputs could be proportionally reduced without a reduction in output. This is usually expressed in percentage terms by the ratio QP/0P, which represents the percentage by which all inputs could be reduced. The technical efficiency (TE) of a firm is most commonly measured by the ratio: TE = OQ / OP0
Which is equal to one minus QP/0P. It will take a value between zero and one, and hence provides an indicator of the degree of technical inefficiency of the firm. A value of one indicates that the firm is fully technically efficient. For example, the point Q is technically efficient because it lies on the efficient isoquant.
Non -Parametric Method: Data Envelop Analysis (DEA)
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) was pioneered by Charnes et al (1978) and based on the work by Farrell (1957) . DEA is a linear programming technique, which estimates organizational efficiency by measuring the ratio of total inputs employed to total output produced for each organization. This ratio is then compared to others in the sample group to derive an estimate of relative efficiency. DEA identifies the most efficient providers of a good or service by their ability to produce a given level of output using the least number of inputs. Other organizations in the sample group receive an efficiency score determined by the variance in their ratio of inputs employed to outputs produced relative to the most efficient producer in the sample group. DEA is therefore a measure of relative efficiency against the sample group's benchmark best practice. The advantage is that it can be used without input or output prices, which is useful in the case of the water industry where these are often distorted by a lack of competitive forces or political decisions. Instead, simply volumes of output (including quality indicators) and inputs can be used. DEA analysis undertaken to date has tended to rely on a small number of variables (e.g. volume of water delivered, the number of properties connection; operating expenditure, capital) (see Lambert, Dichev and Charnes proposed a flexible approach, Cooper & Rhodes CCR (1978) and it is relative e ciency measurement. The model can be briefly described as follows.
There are m inputs (indexed by the subscript i), s outputs (indexed by subscript r) and n decision making unitsDMUs indexed by subscript j); additionally one assumes that and denote positive inputs and outputs respectively. CCR consider the following optimization problem:
The problem needs to be solved for each DMU and represents the objective of maximizing a virtual output relative to a virtual input subject to the constraint that no DMU can operate beyond the e ciency frontier (constraint 2) and the constraint relating to non-negative weights (constraint 3). In this paper, we will focus on the behavior of technical e ciency as obtained from a DEA model that allows variable returns to scale. Inputs and outputs weights are endogenously determined as the solution to the problem for each DMU. In fact, Banker, Charnes & Cooper-BCC (1984) and Banker (1984) extended the CCR model from the constant returns to scale to the variable returns to scale case. That extension accounts to including an extra convexity restriction in the CCR model. An important result that emerges from those papers refers to the possibility of factoring total e ciency (as obtained from de CCR model) as the product of technical e ciency (as obtained from the BCC model) and scale e ciency. Therefore, the BCC model is more relevant for analyzing sectors where variable returns to scale is an important feature. The previously mentioned model admits a linear programming representation that has to be solved for each DMU. The resulting scores are relative e ciency measures where a score of 1 indicates an e cient unit whereas scores that are less than 1 indicate ine cient units. Ine cient units are identified by comparison with reference units (peers). Therefore, it is desirable that the involved units must be comparable. It is also important to emphasize that the model imposes few restrictions on the production set and an associated convenience is that one does not need to assume a direct transformation of the postulated inputs into the chosen outputs.
Malmquist Productivity Index
So far, the focus has been on evaluating firm performance at appointed in time. To evaluate the efficiency change overtime, the Malmquist productivity index is issued in the following analysis:
Suppose each produces a vector of outputs by using a vector of inputs at each time period t, t=1, 2, T. When multiple inputs are used to produce multiple outputs, Shephard's (1953) distance functions provide a functional characterization of the Structure of production technology. The output distance function is defined on the output set, P (x), as:
( 1) The Malmquist productivity index is defined as: (2) Measures the productivity change of between period t and t+1. A value greater than one indicates positive productivity growth from period t to period t+1. A value less than one indicate negative productivity growth from period t to period t+1(Färeetal.1994a).
The Malmquist productivity index can be decomposed in to two components: efficiency change (catch-up effect) and frontier shift (technological change). 
According to Fare et al. (1994b) , EC can be further decomposed into scale efficiency change and pure technology change. Ray and Desli (1997) pointed out the internal potential inconsistency problem of the further decomposition -both CRS and VRS models are used in the same decomposition. Consequently, the current paper uses the accepted decomposition shown in (6). Table 2 presents the name of input and output variables. And Table 3 presents means and standard deviations for input and output variables of the 35 water & wastewater companies.
Inputs and Outputs Variables

Results
Technical and scale efficiency scores for water & wastewater companies can be found in table 4. Also the potential cost saving and productivity changes based on Malmquist Index can be found in tables 4 and 5 respectively.
Conclusion
The results of analysis indicate that average efficiency of WWCs under constant return to scale (CRS) is equal to 77% (technical efficiency) and under variable return to scale (VRS) to 88% (scale efficiency). In other words, there is a possibility for improvement of water production equal to 23% and 12% respectively with the existing resources and possibilities. Also, in terms of constant return to scale (CRS), by improving technical efficiency, cost savings potential account to 1874 billion Rials, which is over 16% of the total operating cost of 35 major water & wastewater companies in 2010/2011. Also, the Malmquist index for total factor productivity (TFP) and technology change were calculated as 0.951 and 0.940 respectively, indicating a decrease of productivity in Iran's water & wastewater industry during 2008 to 2011.
The results prove that DEA analysis is a powerful tool for water industry regulators who seek to defend the public interest against the potential abuse of monopoly power and to encourage water providers to improve efficiency. -------Note: Observations, which score less than 1, are inefficient. CRS = Constant returns to scale, VRS = variable returns to scale, SC = scale efficiency irs= increasing returns to scale, drs= decreasing returns to scale, -= constant returns to scale 
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